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ICC passages from its Preliminary Examinations Reports 
on Afghanistan 2011 to 2015 
Prepared by Craig Scott, June 20, 2016; updated 
November 1, 2016 
Introductory comments from Craig Scott: 
The International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor summarizes the fact of there still being a 
preliminary examination underway on Afghanistan at https://www.icc-cpi.int/afghanistan:  
“Procedural history and focus of the preliminary examination 
The preliminary examination of the situation in Afghanistan was made public in 2007. 
The OTP has received numerous communications under article 15 of the Rome Statute 
related to this situation. The preliminary examination focusses on crimes listed in the 
Rome Statute allegedly committed in the context of the armed conflict between pro-
Government forces and anti-Government forces, including the crimes against humanity 
of murder, and imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty; and the war 
crimes of murder; cruel treatment; outrages upon personal dignity; the passing of 
sentences and carrying out of executions without proper judicial authority; intentional 
attacks against civilians, civilian objects and humanitarian assistance missions; and 
treacherously killing or wounding an enemy combatant. The preliminary examination 
also focusses on the existence and genuineness of national proceedings in relation to 
these crimes.” 
Note that the ICC Prosecutor, in the 2014 and 2015 reports, started noting that the Prosecutor’s 
Office had moved into an admissibility assessment of a fairly wide variety of cases concerning 
Afghanistan. In 2015, the report sets out “complementarity” and “gravity” analyses for 
potential cases, which is one step beyond how the 2014 report had been framed.   
Apart from cases being considered against the Taliban, two actors are singled out for mention 
by the Prosecutor with respect to torture of captives (the Afghan National Directorate of 
Security, or NDS, and the United States).  
One gets the distinct sense from the 2015 report that the ICC is getting closer to requesting 
authority to start a formal investigation (keep in mind how this would be focused on identifying 
the most responsible actors and seeing what specific proof can tie them to the case situations), 
which is of course still shy of charging and prosecuting.   
We can assume Canadian diplomats and lawyers may have made representations to the ICC 
Prosecutor’s Office in order to try to keep Canada out of the Prosecutor’s preliminary 
examination reports.  Indeed, it will not be surprising, for purely juridical reasons, if Canada 
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continues not to be specifically mentioned if and when the ICC Prosecutor brings a motion to 
the ICC judges to open an investigation.  This is because the hands-on torture, extrajudicial 
executions, etc that are the meat of the war crimes and possible crimes against humanity are 
crimes alleged to have been directly committed by the Taliban, Afghanistan and the US.   
However (and this is a major “however”), although Canada is not mentioned so far in these five 
years of reports, nothing precludes the ICC Prosecutor taking a hard look at Canadian officials’ 
conduct once her office starts doing an actual investigation of alleged criminal practices within 
the over-all “Afghanistan situation”, notably authorities like the NDS and the US (apart from its 
investigation also of the Taliban, of course).  In the ICC’s Rome Statute, what I am generally 
calling “complicity” is clearly covered as its own form of perpetration of war crimes and crimes 
against humanity.   
That said, we can still refer in a loose sense to the hands-on torturers as principals the 
investigation of whom makes sense as the initial and primary focus of ICC Prosecutor efforts, 
before one then looks to see who may have facilitated, aided and abetted, and so on. Thus, 
once Afghanistan and the US are under formal investigation, all the evidence of Canada’s 
complicity that various Canadians have sent to the ICC Prosecutor since around 2005 becomes 
even harder for the ICC to ignore.   
Apart from extending any “Afghanistan situation” investigation to Canadians’ possible 
complicity, the Prosecutor may also want to turn to Canadian records and sources for whatever 
light they may cast on evidence of torture by Afghanistan agencies’ propensity to torture (and 
kill extra-judicially) and actual torture practices (and actual extrajudicial executions).  Once 
evidence from Canadian sources is examined, the extent of Canadian officials’ knowledge of 
torture could then start to emerge and, in turn, cause the Prosecutor’s investigators to start 
asking questions about complicity by Canadian officials. 
Of course, we must keep one very important fact in mind, related to the possibility that the ICC 
Prosecutor ends up choosing not to charge any Canadians in the years to come: not being 
charged at the ICC in no way means that a person is not guilty of war crime and in no way 
means that a person could not still be charged and prosecuted nationally under Canada’s own 
criminal law statutes dealing with torture and war crimes.  A decision not to exercise ICC 
jurisdiction is in no way a decision that there were no crimes, because the Prosecutor makes 
decisions based on criteria that include comparative gravity and investigative/prosecutorial 
resources available.  No doubt any future failure to charge any Canadians for complicity would 
be invoked in Canada and by government-side lawyers as a de facto assessment that Canadians 
bear no criminal responsibility and thus a vindication; nothing can prevent such inaccurate 
misrepresentations, and, so, if and when that time were to come, they would need to be 






The following is Craig Scott’s digested selection of extracts from the Prosecutor’s annual 
reports from 2011 to 2015:  
 2011 
Torture: There have been allegations of acts of torture or other cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment against detainees by various parties to the conflict. The Office 
has received and will continue seeking further information on steps taken by the 
Afghan Government and pro-government forces to thoroughly examine such 
allegations and ensure accountability for those possibly involved in the 
mistreatment of prisoners. 
 
2012 
28. Torture and other forms of ill-treatment: Persons in the custody of the Afghan 
authorities and/or international military forces have allegedly been subject to 
possibly abusive interrogation techniques. In March 2012, the Afghanistan 
Independent Human Rights Commission documented instances of abuse in nine 
National Directorate of Security (NDS) facilities. 
 
29. The Government of Afghanistan informed the Office that it has undertaken a 
comprehensive review and investigation of alleged incidents of mistreatment in 
Afghan prisons, and has taken steps to ensure the promotion and protection of 




Situations under Phase 2 (Subject-Matter Jurisdiction)  
Afghanistan 
 
27. Afghan government forces and/or international military forces reportedly conducted 
military operations, including aerial attacks, force protection incidents and night raid operations 
which resulted in civilian deaths. The number of civilian deaths caused by members of Afghan 
government forces and/or international military forces has gradually decreased over time 
reaching an all-time low in the first half of 2013. However, several air strikes conducted in the 




28. Torture and other forms of ill-treatment: Persons in the custody of Afghan authorities and 
international forces have reportedly been subject to abusive techniques such as beatings, 
electric shocks, sleep deprivation, forced nudity and other forms of ill-treatment. In March 
2012, the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) documented cases of 
abuses in nine National Directorate of Security facilities while in January 2013, UNAMA 
reported on 326 alleged cases of torture and other forms of ill-treatment based on visits to 89 
detention facilities under the control of Afghan forces in the period between October 2011 and 
October 2012.  
 
29. The Afghan government informed the Office of the measures it has taken to address 
allegations related to torture and other forms of ill-treatment, including granting the 
international organizations access to detention facilities across the country. The government 
also informed the Office about an internal investigation carried out by National Directorate for 
Security into allegations of torture and other forms of ill-treatment towards detainees in 
various provinces, including Kandahar, Laghman, Kunduz, Faryab, Nangarhar, Takhar, Jowzjan, 
Paktika and Khwost.  
 
2014 
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction  
 
79. The situation in Afghanistan is usually considered as an armed conflict of a non-
international character between the Afghan Government, supported by the ISAF and US forces 
on the one hand (pro-government forces), and non-state armed groups, particularly the 
Taliban, on the other (anti-government groups). The participation of international forces does 
not change the non-international character of the conflict since these forces became involved 
in support of the Afghan Transitional Administration established on 19 June 2002.  
 
80. As detailed in previous reporting,20 the Office has found that the information available 
provides a reasonable basis to believe that crimes under articles 7 and 8 of the Statute have 
been committed in the situation in Afghanistan, including crimes against humanity of murder 
under article 7(1)(a), and imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty under 
article 7(1)(e); murder under article 8(2)(c)(i); cruel treatment under article 8(2)(c)(i); outrages 
upon personal  dignity under article 8(2)(c)(ii); the passing of sentences and carrying out of 
executions without previous judgement pronounced by a regularly constituted court under 
article 8(2)(c)(iv); intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population or against 
individual civilians under article 8(2)(e)(i); intentionally directing attacks against personnel, 
material, units or vehicles involved in a humanitarian assistance under article 8(2)(e)(iii); 
intentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to education, cultural objects, places 
of worship and similar institutions under article 8(2)(e)(iv); and treacherously killing or 




81. The Office has continued to gather and receive information on alleged crimes committed 
during the reporting period, including alleged killings, abductions, torture and other forms of ill-
treatment, attacks on civilian objects, the use of human shields, the imposition of punishments 




82. According to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), over 17,500 
civilians have been killed in the conflict in Afghanistan in the period between January 2007 and 
June 2014. Members of anti-government armed groups were responsible for at least 12,100 
civilian deaths, while pro-government forces were responsible for at least 3,552 civilian deaths. 
A number of reported killings remain unattributed.  
…. 
 
Admissibility Assessment  
 
84. Following a thorough legal assessment of the information available, the Office identified 
potential cases in the situation in Afghanistan falling within the jurisdiction of the Court, on the 
basis of which the Office is analysing admissibility. The selection of potential cases identified 
below is without prejudice to any further findings on subject-matter jurisdiction to be made 
pursuant to additional information that the Office could receive at a later stage of analysis. In 
addition, the legal characterisation of these cases and any alleged crimes may be revisited at a 




91. As noted in previous reporting,21 there is information available that the war 
crimes of torture, and outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and 
degrading treatment, have allegedly been committed by members of pro- government 
forces. 
 
92. The practice of torturing conflict-related detainees in order to obtain information or 
confessions appears to be a common practice, particularly in Afghanistan’s  
principal intelligence agency, the National Directorate for Security (NDS), and therefore forms a 
potential case identified by the Office. Other alleged incidents of torture or ill-treatment have 
also been attributed to members of the Afghan National Police (ANP), the Afghan Local Police 
(ALP), and the Afghan National Army (ANA). The vast majority of documented cases have been 
attributed to the NDS and the ANP as detaining authorities.  
 
93. The pattern of use of interrogation techniques includes beatings (with kicks, punches, 
electrical cables, etc.), suspension by the wrists or ankles, electric shocks, twisting and 
wrenching of the genitals, stress positions, and burning with cigarettes. Victims were captured 
in the context of the armed conflict suspected of being Taliban fighters, suicide attack 
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facilitators, producers of IEDs and others implicated in crimes associated with the armed 
conflict in Afghanistan.  
 
94. The Office has been assessing available information relating to the alleged abuse of 
detainees by international forces within the temporal jurisdiction of the Court. In particular, the 
alleged torture or ill-treatment of conflict-related detainees by US armed forces in Afghanistan 
in the period 2003-2008 forms another potential case identified by the Office. In accordance 
with the Presidential Directive of 7 February 2002, Taliban detainees were denied the status of 
prisoner of war under article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention but were required to be treated 
humanely. In this context, the information available suggests that between May 2003 and June 
2004, members of the US military in Afghanistan used so-called “enhanced interrogation 
techniques” against conflict-related detainees in an effort to improve the level of actionable 
intelligence obtained from interrogations. The development and implementation of such 
techniques is documented inter alia in declassified US Government documents released to the 
public, including Department of Defense reports as well as the US Senate Armed Services 
Committee’s inquiry. These reports describe interrogation techniques approved for use as 
including food deprivation, deprivation of clothing, environmental manipulation, sleep 
adjustment, use of individual fears, use of stress positions, sensory deprivation (deprivation of 
light and sound), and sensory overstimulation.  
 
95. Certain of the enhanced interrogation techniques apparently approved by US senior 
commanders in Afghanistan in the period from February 2003 through June 2004, could, 
depending on the severity and duration of their use, amount to cruel treatment, torture or 
outrages upon personal dignity as defined under international jurisprudence. In addition, there 
is information available that interrogators allegedly committed abuses that were outside the 
scope of any approved techniques, such as severe beating, especially beating on the soles of 
the feet, suspension by the wrists, and threats to shoot or kill.  
 
96. While continuing to assess the seriousness and reliability of such allegations, the Office is 
analysing the relevance and genuineness of national proceedings by the competent national 
authorities for the alleged conduct described above as well as the gravity of the alleged crimes.  
 
97. Having analysed the information available on civilian casualties caused by air strikes, “night 
raids” and escalation-of-force incidents attributed to pro-government forces, the Office 
assesses that the information available does not provide a reasonable basis to believe that the 
war crime of intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population as such or against 
individual civilians not taking direct part in hostilities pursuant to article 8(2)(e)(i) has been 
committed. In relation to allegations over proportionality, the Office recalls that the Rome 
Statute does not contain a provision for the war crime of intentionally launching a 
disproportionate attack in the context of a non-international armed conflict. Similarly, while the 
Office has received allegations regarding the recruitment and use of children by Afghan 
government forces to participate actively in hostilities, the Office has been unable to verify the 
seriousness of the information received; these allegations remain insufficiently substantiated to 




OTP Activities  
 
98. From 15-19 November 2013, the Office conducted a mission to Kabul and participated in an 
international seminar on peace, reconciliation and transitional justice held at Kabul University. 
During the mission, the Office held a number of meetings with representatives of Afghan civil 
society and international non-governmental organizations in order to discuss possible solutions 
to challenges raised by the situation in Afghanistan such as security concerns, limited or 
reluctant cooperation, and verification of information.  
 
99. During the reporting period, the Office has continued to gather and verify information on 
alleged crimes committed in the situation in Afghanistan, and to refine its legal analysis of 
potential cases for the purposes of assessing admissibility. In particular, the Office has taken 
successful steps to verify information received on incidents in relation to the above potential 
cases, in order to overcome information gaps in relation to inter alia the attribution of 
incidents, the military or civilian character of a target, or the number of civilian and/or military 
casualties resulting from a given incident. The Office also gathered further information in order 
to enable a more thorough evaluation of the reliability of sources of information on alleged 
crimes.  
 
100. The Office further engaged with relevant States and cooperation partners with a view to 
assess alleged crimes and national proceedings. The Office gathered and received information 
on national proceedings in relation to the above types of conduct.  
 
101. Pursuant to the Office’s policy on sexual and gender-based crimes, the Office examined, in 
particular, whether there is a reasonable basis to believe that the crime against humanity of 
persecution on gender grounds has been or is being  committed in the situation in Afghanistan. 




Conclusion and Next Steps  
102. The Office will continue to analyse allegations of crimes committed in Afghanistan, and to 
assess the admissibility of the potential cases identified above in order to reach a decision on 
whether to seek authorization from the Pre-Trial Chamber to open an investigation of the 
situation in Afghanistan pursuant to article 15(3) of the Statute.  
 
2015 
Admissibility Assessment  
 
121. Following a thorough legal assessment of the information available, the Office is analysing 
the admissibility of potential cases arising from the conduct of three separate groups of alleged 
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perpetrators: members of the Taliban and their affiliates (anti-government groups); members 
of Afghan government forces; and members of international forces. Further information on the 
alleged conduct related to each potential case is detailed in previous reporting.30 The selection 
of potential cases identified herein is without prejudice to any further findings on subject-
matter jurisdiction to be made pursuant to additional information that the Office could receive 
in the future. In addition, the legal characterisation of these cases and any alleged crimes may 
be revisited at a later stage.  
 
122. A brief summary of information relevant to the admissibility analysis of each potential case 




Afghan Government Forces  
 
126. Complementarity: The Government has instituted only a limited number of proceedings 
against alleged perpetrators. Despite the scale of alleged ill-treatment in NDS and ANP 
detention facilities (an estimated 35-51% of conflict-related detainees according to the findings 
of UNAMA’s detention monitoring program), information provided by the Government of 
Afghanistan to UNAMA indicates that to date the Government has prosecuted only two NDS 
officials (in relation to one incident), and no ANP officials, for this conduct. The Government has 
not provided any information on national proceedings to the Office, despite multiple requests 
for such information from the Office since 2008, including two requests submitted during the 
reporting period.  
 
127. Gravity: There are an estimated 5,000 conflict-related detainees in Afghan government 
custody. The manner in which the crimes are alleged to have been committed appears 
particularly gruesome and was seemingly calculated to inflict maximum pain. The alleged 
crimes had severe short-term and long-term impacts on detainees’ physical and mental health, 
including permanent physical injuries.  
 
International Forces  
 
128. Complementarity: US civilian and military courts can exercise their jurisdiction over 
conduct that would constitute a crime within ICC subject-matter jurisdiction (i.e. war crimes, 
crimes against humanity, and genocide), when committed abroad by US nationals. The 
Department of Justice conducted a two-year preliminary review (from August 2009 to June 
2011) of allegations related to the abuse of detainees in the custody of the Central Intelligence 
Agency (“CIA”), which reviewed allegations regarding the ill-treatment of 101 detainees. As a 
result of the review, the Attorney-General conducted full criminal investigations into the cases 
of two detainees who had died in CIA custody. Both investigations were completed in August 
9 
 
2012 and did not result in any indictments or prosecutions. The Attorney-General explained 
that “the Department declined prosecution because the admissible evidence would not be 
sufficient to obtain and sustain a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.”  
 
129. The United States Government indicated to the Committee against Torture that the 
Department of Defense has conducted “thousands of investigations since 2001, and prosecuted 
or disciplined hundreds of service members for mistreatment of detainees and other 
misconduct.” At least 13 senior-level investigations have been conducted by the Department of 
Defense in response to allegations of detainee abuse.31 These investigations were 
administrative enquiries rather than criminal proceedings, although some of them had the 
power to make recommendations relating to individual accountability within their mandates. 
Some of these reports concluded that abuses resulted from unclear policy guidance, insufficient 
training, and command failures, but disciplinary measures recommended for commanders did 
not go higher than the brigade commander level.  
 
130. Gravity: The Office is assessing information relevant to determine the scale of the alleged 
abuse, as well as whether the identified war crimes were committed as part of a plan or policy. 
The information available suggests that victims were deliberately subjected to physical and 
psychological violence, and that crimes were allegedly committed with particular cruelty and in 
a manner that debased the basic human dignity of the victims. The infliction of “enhanced 
interrogation techniques,” applied cumulatively and in combination with each other over a 
prolonged period of time, would have caused serious physical and psychological injury to the 
victims. Some victims reportedly exhibited psychological and behavioural issues, including 




OTP Activities  
 
131. During the reporting period, the Office continued to gather and verify information on 
alleged crimes committed in the situation in Afghanistan, and to refine its identification of 
potential cases for the purposes of assessing admissibility. The Office also continued to gather 
information needed to enable a more thorough evaluation of the reliability of sources of 
information on alleged crimes. The Office gathered and analysed information relevant to reach 
determinations on the admissibility of potential cases likely to arise from an investigation of the 
situation.  
 
132. The Office further engaged with relevant States and other information providers with a 
view to assess alleged crimes and national proceedings, and took steps to address information 
gaps in relation to inter alia the attribution of incidents, the military or civilian character of a 
target, the number of civilian and/or military casualties resulting from a given incident, and the 




133. In October 2015, the Office carried out a security assessment mission to Kabul. To date, 
however, the Office’s planned mission for admissibility assessment purposes has been 
frustrated by the non-permissive situation in the country.  
 
Conclusion and Next Steps  
 
134. While continuing to analyse allegations of crimes committed in Afghanistan, the Office will 
finalise its analysis of admissibility issues, including by gathering outstanding information on the 
existence and genuineness of relevant national proceedings, taking into consideration the 
Office’s policy to focus on those most responsible for the most serious crimes.  
 
 
135. The Office will also continue to gather information relevant to the assessment of whether 
there are substantial reasons to believe that an investigation would not serve the interests of 
justice prior to making a decision on whether to seek authorisation from the Pre-Trial Chamber 
to open such an investigation of the situation in Afghanistan.  
 
 
 
 
